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Research Paper no. 3/08 
 
INCENTIVES AND MANAGERIAL  
EXPERIENCE IN MULTI-TASK TEAMS:  
EVIDENCE FROM WITHIN A FIRM 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper exploits a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the impact that a multi-
dimensional group incentive scheme had on branch performance in a large 
distribution firm. The scheme, which is based on the Balanced Scorecard, was 
implemented in all branches in one division, but not in another. Branches from the 
second division are used as a control group. Our results suggest that the balanced 
scorecard had some impact, but that it varied with branch characteristics, and in 
particular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond to 
the new incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
Many organisations provide some form of incentive pay to managers and workers. 
What form should these incentives take? This is the topic of many papers in the 
economic and management literatures. A well known theoretical result suggests that 
workers should not be made jointly responsible for single tasks, because sharing 
responsibility increases the total risk that each worker faces of successfully 
completing the task without increasing the benefit (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). 
Holmstrom and Milgrom also suggest that tasks should be grouped together, based on 
the cost of measuring and rewarding performance in that dimension. Some workers 
should do the easy-to-measure tasks, and their pay should be contingent on 
performance, while other workers should focus on hard to measures tasks and 
received fixed wages. This is because if a worker has both easy and hard to measure 
tasks they will concentrate on the easy to measure tasks, as the expense of the hard to 
measure tasks. 
However, one of the most widely used incentives schemes - the Balanced Scorecard - 
runs counter to these results. The Balanced Scorecard was introduced by Kaplan and 
Norton (1992), and variants of it have been adopted by a large number of firms and 
organisations across the globe.
1
 The idea behind the Balanced Scorecard is that 
managers can improve performance by monitoring and rewarding a large range of 
linked activities (usually 15-20 covering four different dimensions – financial, 
customer, internal and innovation/learning). These activities are designed to reflect 
both current actions that are assumed to impact future performance, as well as the 
outcomes of past actions. Performance is typically evaluated at the group level (for 
example, business unit, branch or team) and incentive payments are often based on 
group performance versus all of the indicators. Thus as well as forming the basis for 
an incentive scheme, the Balanced Scorecard also provides information to managers 
and workers: “The Balanced Scorecard is like the dials in an airplane cockpit: it 
gives managers complex information at a glance.” (Kaplan and Norton, 1991, p71) 
As well as running counter to results from the economics literature, the use and 
effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard has been criticised in the management 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, the Balanced Scorecard Hall of Fame at http://www.bscol.com/pdf/BSCHoF-
Membersby_Industry_2000-2005.pdf, or see Gates (1999) who surveys 113 “leading” US, European 
and Asian companies and finds that 81% of respondents use a strategic performance measurement 
system; Maisel (2001) samples 1990 US management accountants and finds that 47% of respondents 
use a strategic performance measurement system; Rigby (2001) surveys 214 North American firms 
and finds that 44% of organisations use the Balanced Scorecard; Speckbacher et al (2003) estimate 
that 26% of firms in Germany, Switzerland and Austria use the Balanced Scorecard, and Marr et al 
(2004) find that 35% of North American organisations use it. 
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literature.
2
 Some of the assumptions of causality that underpin the designed of 
balanced scorecards are challenged (Nørreklit, 2000; Nørreklit, 2003). Ittner et al. 
(1998) present a compelling case illustrating the difficulty of basing an incentive 
scheme on a balanced scorecard. While Jensen (1991) argues that the Balanced 
Scorecard will do nothing to solve the agency problem. It provides no information on 
how managers and workers should trade off different objectives, so will fail as an 
incentive mechanism, although he accepts that it may provide useful information to 
managers on the company’s strategy and drivers of value. 
With all these arguments against the Balanced Scorecard why have so many firms 
adopted it? Has it been an effective incentive scheme? Does it provide useful 
information to managers? The rapid uptake of the Balanced Scorecard has been 
largely fuelled by high profile success stories in other firms, yet there is little 
empirical evidence on how well the scheme works.
3
   
In this paper we exploit a quasi-experimental setting within a single firm in order to 
investigate the effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard. The firm implemented the 
Balanced Scorecard in one division to see how well it would work before rolling it out 
across the firm. This allows us to overcome one of the main problems in evaluating 
incentive schemes – the fact that who adopts the incentive mechanisms is endogenous 
- by comparing monthly performance across a large number of branches in two 
different divisions.
4
 
Another advantage of our setting is that the firm initially used profit related pay in all 
divisions. This means that we are able to identify the impact of the particular form of 
incentive scheme, rather then conflate the impact of any form of incentive pay with 
this particular form of incentive pay. We also investigate the idea that it was not the 
incentive aspect of the Balanced Scorecard that was influential, but that it improved 
the information that was transmitted to managers and workers and this helped them to 
focus their actions on more profitable margins. 
We find that the Balanced Scorecard changed behaviour, but that overall this change 
did not lead to increased profits in all the branches where it was implemented – in 
some cases costs increased by at least as much as sales. However, the impact varied 
across branches - branches with more experienced managers were able to effectively 
                                                 
2
  See, inter alia, Cools and van Praag (2003), Fink (2004), Gosling (2003), Jensen (1991, 2001) and 
Ittner, Larcker and Meyer (1998), Nørreklit (2000), Nørreklit (2003). There is also an earlier 
literature, for example, Ridgway (1956) criticises the idea of multidimensional incentives schemes. 
3
  Hoque and James (2000) survey 66 Austrailian manufacturing firms, Banker, Potter and Srinivsan 
(2000) look at 18 hotels, Malina and Selto (2001) consider multiple divisions of a large firm, Ittner, 
Larcker and Meyer (2003) conduct a case study in a large firm, Neely, Martinez and Kennerly (2004) 
consider 35 branches in one firm, Davis and Albright (2004) look at nine branches of a firm, Burgess 
et al (2004) evaluate a randomised trial incentive scheme in Job Centres in the UK.  
4
  Burgess et al (2004) are able to evaluate the introduction of a team based multi-task incentive scheme 
in Job Centres in the UK, where implementation was randomised. 
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improve performance, while less experienced managers were not able to effectively 
improve performance. We use interviews with a number of individual managers to 
explore the idea that the impact of experience enabled managers to better interpret the 
large number of indicators and to effectively allocate effort within the branch.  
The idea is that it is not only the incentives that matter, but also the ability of 
managers and workers to respond to them. When it is necessary for managers and 
workers to perform a large number of tasks (for example, the tasks involved in 
running a retail establishment), it is important that the manager can effectively decide 
where best to put both his and workers’ marginal effort. The Balanced Scorecard 
gives the manager additional information on past performance, but does not tell the 
manager where additional marginal effort will be most effective. It gives the same 
incentive to all measures. This has been one of the main features that has been 
criticised (Jensen, 2001), that the Balanced Scorecard does not tell managers where 
marginal effort will be the most effective in improving performance. We interpret the 
fact that more experience managers were able to achieve better performance under the 
Balanced Scorecard as showing that it requires additional ability (acquired through 
experience) for the manager to know where the greatest pay off will be. We 
corroborate this interpretation in interviews with a large number of branch managers. 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the 
firm, the Balanced Scorecard, how it was implemented and the impact we would 
expect to find. Section 3 describes the data and our empirical approach. Section 4 
presents the results. A final section summarises and concludes. 
2. The Setting 
We describe the firm, the incentive scheme, how it was design and implemented, and 
then discuss what impact we expect to see on performance. 
2.1 The firm 
The firm is a multinational distributor of heating and plumbing products (see Figure 
1). It has thousands of branches in over ten European and North American countries 
and employs around 50,000 people. In the UK there are four main divisions. Both 
divisions have several sub-divisions, or brands. We use data on the largest brand in 
the two largest divisions. Each brand is made up of a large number of branches. 
During the period we consider branches dealt primarily with one brand, and acted as 
relatively small trading units, employing between 2 and 32 staff (with a mean of 10).  
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Figure 1: Firm Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We compare performance in the dominant brand in Division 1 (where the Balanced 
Scorecard was introduced) with the dominant brand in Division 2. Prior to August 
2002 both divisions used the same incentive scheme, which was based only on branch 
profits. Division 2 kept this scheme after August 2002. The two divisions are similar 
in terms of average sales and profits per branch. They differ in that they sell distinct 
product (which are both used in building). Another distinction is that the average 
value of and margin earned on the product sold in Division 2 is higher. However, the 
branches operate in similar economic conditions, for example, they employ people 
from the same labour markets, and experience similar demand shocks. 
The dominant component of firm profits is individual branch profits, though there are 
also orders received at head office and volume discounts that head office receives 
from suppliers (called rebates). In this study we focus on branch profits. Profits of an 
individual branch are the revenue earned on the sale of each product, minus the costs 
of sale, minus central branch costs. The main elements of cost at the branch level are 
the cost of goods sold, labour costs, infrastructure (including capital costs), 
distribution and transport costs. Other costs include general and administration costs, 
spending on information technology, local marketing, advertising and other branch 
level administrative costs. These are described further in the data section below. 
Effort of branch staff and branch managers can affect outcomes in the following 
ways: 
• the price paid for a product can vary with each transaction (branch staff have 
discretion to negotiate individual prices, starting from a base price);  
• staff deal directly with customers and thus have influence on the quantity, type 
and range of products sold;  
Main  Board 
UK Board Foreign Businesses 
Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 
Brand A 
Brand B 
… 
Brand C 
Brand D 
… 
… … 
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• branch (as well as regional) managers influence the quantity sold through 
setting base price levels, marketing and setting special offers; 
• staff and branch (as well as regional) managers’ actions can affect hiring and 
firing costs (through staff retention levels), volume discounts (through the type 
and quantity of goods sold) and various other branch level costs in a number 
of ways.  
A typical branch is managed by a branch manager,
5
 and has an administrator who 
works in the office, two or three sales staff, a driver, and three or four people who 
work in the warehouse or stockyard. Further details are given in Table A.1 in the Data 
Appendix. The role of the manager, among other things, is to decide on hiring 
decision (in conjunction with head office), allocate staff to tasks, decide on special 
offers and decide on the level and type of local marketing activity.  
2.2 The incentive scheme 
Prior to August 2002 employees in both divisions received a bonus that was a 
function of branch level profits. The bonus was allocated to branches based on a 
percentage of their profits, and was allocated to branch staff by the branch manager, at 
his discretion and in consultation with the regional manager. 
Senior management became concerned that the profit-based bonus scheme was 
leading to dysfunctional behaviours, as is emphasised in the literature.
6
 For example, 
managers had incentives to adjust the timing of capital investment where they would 
affect bonus payments, and they faced incentives to compete for business with other 
local branches, because profits were calculated on a point of sale basis. The firm was 
also concerned that branch staff were not putting sufficient effort into activities that 
enhanced long-run profitability, such as maintaining customer loyalty and 
relationships with suppliers. Senior management decided to change the basis of the 
performance measurement and incentive scheme in the organisation. They decided to 
trial a new scheme, based on the Balanced Scorecard, in Division 1 prior to rolling it 
out across the firm. The Balanced Scorecard was designed to overcome the dual 
problems of subjective performance evaluation (which can give rise to various forms 
of bias and encourage workers to waste effort to curry favour with managers) and 
focussing on one key performance target (which can lead to dysfunctional behaviour 
                                                 
5
 The branch manager reports to a regional manager who reports to a brand operations director, who 
reports to a brand managing director who reports to a divisional managing director, who reports to the 
board. 
6
  See, inter alia, review by Prendergast (1999) and Hayes and Abernathy (1980). 
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with workers focusing all their energy on tasks that are rewarded, and ignoring those 
that are not included in the incentive scheme).
7
 
The new incentives scheme made three big changes (i) it used multiple targets rather 
than a single target, (ii) it was non-discretionary rather than discretionary, (iii) it 
provided more information to managers on a wide range of indicators, such as 
customer behaviour and efficiency, then was previously available. 
The specific incentive scheme that the firm implemented works as follows. The firm 
identified 17 key indicators of performance, including both financial and non-
financial indicators of performance. Incentives were paid to each employee on a six-
monthly basis, but effectively earned on a monthly basis. For branch staff and branch 
managers the payment was based on the number of points the branch earned in the 
month times the value of a point.
8
 Each branch is graded “green”, “amber” or “red” on 
each of the 17 measures contained in the balanced scorecard. A green grade earns 3 
points, an amber grade 1.5 points and a red grade 0 points. The total number of points 
earned by the branch is given by, 
 points = (3 x green + 1.5 x amber) x number of people in branch. 
There are 17 measures in total so the maximum number of points per employee a 
branch can earn in a month is 51. In 2003 a point was worth £1 for branch staff (the 
value of a point is higher for managers) so the maximum bonus a branch worker could 
earn in a month was £51, or £612 a year. The average salary of branch workers is 
around £12,000, so the maximum bonus represents 5.1% of their salary.  
The total amount the firm allocated for the scheme was £1,836,000. This was set aside 
in a separate account to signal the firm’s commitment to the scheme. The previous 
scheme, based on profits, cost about the same total amount.
9
 As well as changing the 
incentive structure, an important aspect of the Balanced Scorecard was the provision 
of more detailed information on performance, and crucially on several leading 
indicators of profitability. Each branch manager received a detailed report every 
month on the 17 measures. 
Why did the firm implement the Balanced Scorecard in Division 1 and not Division 
2? This is an important question, as our strategy for identifying the impact of the 
Balanced Scorecard relies on performance being independent of this decision. The 
                                                 
7
 See Argyris (1952), Ridgway (1956), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Kerr (1995) and for a recent 
review of the literature Prendergast (1999). 
8
 For regional managers it is based on the average of the points earned in branches under their control. 
For central office staff it is calculated based on a simplified version of the balanced scorecard 
containing only measures that the central office staff could affect. 
9
 The firm estimates the cost of implementation at around £0.5m, including the direct and indirect costs 
such as management time. 
 
8 
pragmatic reason is simply that the Divisions were run relatively independently and 
the Managing Director of Division 1 was rather more keen on management innovation, 
and particularly the Balanced Scorecard. At the outset the organisation considered 
whether it would subsequently implement the Balanced Scorecard in other divisions, 
but in essence decided to delay a decision and instead treat Division 1’s 
implementation as a pilot study. Thus, we argue that the introduction can be treated as 
independent of any expectations about the impact the Balanced Scorecard would have 
in one Division over the other. 
2.3 The design and implementation process 
In evaluating the impact of the Balanced Scorecard we need to be careful to 
distinguish two questions - (i) did the new incentive scheme change behaviour, and 
(ii) did this behaviour lead to improved performance. The idea behind the Balanced 
Scorecard is that the firm needs to determine what are the key drivers of future 
profitability and build these into the incentive scheme.  
The board devoted significant time to discussing what were the objectives for the 
division, what behaviours they wanted to encourage in the branch network, and how 
these behaviours might be reinforced through the choice and design of appropriate 
performance measures. At various stages during the process the directors consulted 
regional and branch managers. The firm invested considerably in education and 
training, as well as engagement with workers at all levels throughout this time.
10
 In 
the end the firm adopted 17 measures, shown in Figure 2 and described further in 
Tables 1.
11
 
Following a 9 month design and deployment process the Balanced Scorecard was 
introduced in business from 1
st
 August 2002.  The business’ financial year ran from 
1
st
 August-31
st
 July and the scheme was operated for the time period 1
st
 August 2002-
31
st
 December 2005.  For the purposes of this evaluation we will focus on two 
financial years 1
st
 August 2002-31
st
 July 2003 and 1
st
 August 2003-31
st
 July 2004. 
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 The discussions were about what the objectives of the division were and who had control over them. 
Meetings were held in every branch and discussion was in depth and focussed on what individual 
workers could do to improve performance. 
11
 Personal development was included as a measure, but the data were not adequately collected, so it 
was not used. The employee satisfaction survey had a low response rate (e.g 32% in December 2002), 
but the firm used it anyway. 
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Figure 2: The Scorecard Measures 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Anticipated impact on performance 
How do we expect the three key changes - (i) introduction of multiple measures, (ii) 
move from discretionary to non-discretionary, and (iii) increased information to affect 
performance? Remember that, as mentioned above, there was no major change in the 
overall value of incentives, just in their form. 
In order to consider how it would affect performance we consider the incentives that 
individuals faced and how they changes. We assume that individuals seek to 
maximise their income, net of effort. Income consists of a base wage and an incentive 
payment, which is a function of performance. Performance is a function of the effort 
of all staff, managers and directors. Effort is costly. Individuals will exert effort up to 
the point where the marginal cost of effort equals the marginal benefit, in terms of the 
incentive payment. This is true under either scheme. What changed is the way 
performance is measured and rewarded. 
 
 
 
Financial measures 
Return on Capital Employed 
Growth in Profit 
PBIT as a % of Sales 
Customer measures 
 Customer Satisfaction 
Customer Retention 
Supplier measures 
Spend with Approved Suppliers 
Internal measures 
Operational Efficiency 
Operational Standards 
People measures 
Staff Retention 
Personal Development 
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Table 1: Balanced Scorecard Measures 
Financial measures  
Return on Capital Employed [PBIT/(Debtors + Stock + Fixed Assets)] x 100 
Growth in Profit 
[(Contribution This Year To Date-Contribution Last Year To Date) / Contribution 
Last Year To Date]  x 100 
PBIT as a % of Sales (Contribution YTD/ Sales YTD) x 100 
Positive Cash Flow 
[[Contribution – (+/- Stock Movement £’s) + (+/- Debtors Movement £’s) = Basic 
Cash Flow] / Total Sales] x 100 
Sales Growth 
[(Sales PWD This Year To Date – Sales PWD Last Year To Date) / Sales PWD 
Last Year To Date] x 100 
Customer measures  
Customer Satisfactionb Score achieved via an external survey 
Customer Retention 
[(No. of Customers retained in rolling 12 months to current month – No. of 
Customer retained in rolling 12 months to last month) / No. of Customers retained 
in rolling 12 months to last month] x 100 
Sales Mix 
[(Sales of Selected SPGs This Year to Date  – Sales of Selected SPGs Last Year to 
Date) / Sales of Selected LLSPGs Last Year to Date] x 100 
Availability of Stock Range 
(Sum of Number of Days where Stock Ins for your MBR are equal to or greater 
than 90% / Number of Trading Days) x 100 
Internal measures  
Operational Efficiency 
Stock/Debtors/Labour/Transport – Yes/No against individual targets: Stock 40 
days, Debtors 0.5% against Sales, Labour 10% against Ex-Stock Sales, Transport 
8% against Delivered Sales, where 25% is awarded per point 
Operational Standards 
(Score from Operational Standards Check List / Total possible score from 
Operational Standards) x 100 
Inter-company Co-operation 
[(Number of Customers trading with foreign Branches This YTD – Number of 
Customers trading with foreign Branches Last YTD) / Number of Customers 
trading with foreign Branches LYTD] x 100 
People measures  
Staff retention 
(Number of voluntary leavers on a rolling 12 month basis / Average head count in 
rolling 12 months) x 100 
Employee satisfaction 
(The number of people who indicate they are satisfied at work / average number of 
employees over the period) x 100 
Communication  
(Number of people who feel they have been made aware of businesses activities / 
Average number of employees over the period) x 100 (By Region) 
Supplier measures  
Spend with Approved Suppliers 
(Purchases from preferred Suppliers This Year To Date / Total purchases from 
Suppliers This Year To Date) x 100 
11 
The main objectives of the firm were to encourage workers to put more effort into a 
broad range of activities that were previously not rewarded, but which the directors of 
the firm believed feed into long-term profits (long term being over several months to 
one to two years). The tasks concerned are substitutes from the individual workers 
point of view (they each take time and an individual worker can spend time on one 
task or another), but from the point of view of the firm and value-maximisation they 
are complements, in the sense that workers need to spend time on all of the tasks in 
order to maximise the value of the firm. For example, a worker can either sweep the 
floor or restock the shelves - from the workers point of view these are substitute 
activities. But from a customer’s point of view these are complementary 
characteristics of a shop - they want both a clean shop and well stocked shelves. 
Where workers undertake tasks that are substitutes for each other, and where the 
rewards are equal and independent (as is the case here), then workers will devote 
more time to those tasks they find easiest. If the measurement of some tasks is more 
precise, or more clearly understood – in the sense that it is easier to identify 
improvements in performance - then workers will devote more time to those tasks that 
are measured more precisely.
12
 This is essentially the objection that Jensen (2001) and 
others have made to the Balanced Scorecard - it does not give clear guidance to 
workers as to what is the most important task to perform (should they spend another 
10 minutes sweeping the floor, or should they start stocking the shelves), but rather 
allows them to put too much effort into non-profitable tasks (either because they have 
mis-information about the payoff to the individual tasks or because both are rewarded 
so they simply do the one that is easiest). 
The Balance Scorecard scheme with 17 measures was complex, and managers were 
provided with large amounts of information. In order to effectively use this 
information the manager needed to be able to assimilate it and understand what it 
meant in terms of future profitability. A key issue is that the data as presented in the 
Balanced Scorecard was very aggregated, hence managers were not able to directly 
take action based on them. Each manager need to be able to translate the information 
provided on the Balanced Scorecard so that it told them something specific about the 
local situation. For example, consider one of the measures - customer retention. Each 
month the manager would be given information on how many customers they were 
retaining compared to the same time last year. This is a useful leading indicator of 
profitability. However, simply knowing that you retained 5% fewer customers then 
this time last year is not sufficient information to enable the manager or shop workers 
to be able to act on it. They needed to be able to figure our which customers were not 
coming back and why in order to know where to put effort in order to increase 
retention rates. This is where experience comes in. Our thesis is that experienced 
managers are either more likely to have seen in the past, or are better able now to 
develop, local solutions that allow them to take action to improve performance 
                                                 
12
  See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Burgess et al (2004). 
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according to the Balanced Scorecard. A more experienced manager will both be better 
able to interpret the large number of indicators, and better able to (e.g. more credible) 
motivate staff to put effort into the activities that matter for performance; with an 
inexperience managers workers can easily become overloaded with information and 
tasks, leading to underperformance. We explore this idea in our empirical analysis 
below. 
3. Data and econometric method 
3.1 Data 
The main data is drawn from the monthly Profit and Loss (P&L) accounts of the firm. 
We have information at the branch level on sales, gross profits (sales minus cost of 
goods sold), trading profits, labour costs, infrastructure, transport costs, general and 
administrative costs, information technology investment, local marketing and 
advertising expenditure and other costs. We have these data monthly from August 
1999 to July 2005. We also have data on employees in each branch in Division 1 
including their age, job title, and length of tenure in the firm from August 2003 to July 
2004. 
We use the location (postcode) of each branch to match branches from the two 
divisions. There are a number of factors that affect sales, but are both exogenous (not 
affected by actions of the firm) and will have a common effect across both divisions. 
These include the economic cycle, local economic and labour market conditions and 
other local factors. There may, however, be some variation in demand conditions. The 
products sold by division one are used both inside and outside, while those sold by 
division 2 are predominantly used inside. Thus weather conditions will have a 
differential affect on demand for the two goods. To control for this we use monthly 
data from twenty-six weather stations in the UK on the minimum temperature (in 
Celsius) and rain fall (in millimetres). In addition, goods sold by division 2 are used 
more intensively in refitting houses, while goods sold in division 1 are used more 
intensively in new buildings. To control for this we use data on total quarterly 
construction activity in a range of categories to capture variation in aggregate demand. 
These data come from the Construction Products Association. We aggregate separate 
information on aggregate quarterly output for new private sector housing, private and 
public sector remodelling and commercial and industrial development. The firm has 
given us the weight of each of these in demand for each of their brands, and we use 
this to construct a measure of quarterly aggregate demand for each brand. 
13 
Table 2: Mean (in £,000) and standard deviation for Division 1 branches and 
matched Division 2 branches 
 Division 1 Brand A Division 2 Brand C 
(matched only) 
Branches 156 121 
Observations 11076 11076 
Sales 152.5 
(87.8) 
166.4 
(103.4) 
Gross profits 45.7 
(28.3) 
39.9 
(19.1) 
Trading profits 15.3 
(19.4) 
22.8 
(15.6) 
Labour costs 14.9 
(7.7) 
8.8 
(4.2) 
Infrastructure 7.6 
(4.7) 
4.5 
(2.4) 
Transport costs 4.2 
(2.6) 
1.1 
(1.1) 
General and administration 1.4 
(1.3) 
0.8 
(0.6) 
Other 0.9 
(0.7) 
0.7 
(0.5) 
IT 0.48 
(0.22) 
0.49 
(0.13) 
Marketing and advertising 0.15 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
Notes: Values are monthly in nominal £,000 over the period August 1999 to July 2005. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics of the main variables. Tables 4 and 5 show 
descriptive statistics on the number of employees, types of jobs within a branch, and 
the average experience and age of staff. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, weather and demand 
 Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Minimum temperature (in Celsius), measured at 
26 points throughout the UK 
7.28 
(4.17) 
Rain fall (in mm) 
65.7 
(41.0) 
National quarterly demand for activities using 
Brand A products (in £m) 
2628 
(200) 
National quarterly demand for activities using 
Brand  products (in £m) 
2588 
(168) 
Notes: Data on weather if from http://www.met-office.gov.uk/climate/uk/stationdata/ 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, level of sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep Var: sales Division 1 Brand A Division 2 Brand C (matched only) 
       
Aug 2002 - Jul 2003   4958   8276 
   (1571)***   (1705)*** 
       
Aug 2003 - Jul 2004   6986   14239 
   (2535)***   (3483)*** 
       
Aug 2004 - Jul 2005   10970   20639 
   (2645)***   (4258)*** 
       
Demand - Div 1 38 40 20    
 (4)*** (2)*** (6)***    
Demand - Div 2    35 31 -14 
    (7)*** (3)*** (10) 
Min temp in C 3295 778 738 -6903 -604 -601 
 (543)*** (294)*** (294)** (766)**
* 
(435) (437) 
Rain fall in mm -107 -93 -89 -18 -11 -0 
 (22)*** (8)*** (8)*** (30) (12) (12) 
       
Observations 11,076 11,076 11,076 8,591 8,591 8,591 
Branches 156 156 156 121 121 121 
R-squared 0.06 0.34 0.35 0.03 0.15 0.15 
Branch fixed effects  yes yes  yes yes 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Period covered is August 1999 to July 2005. Constant and 
month dummies included in all regressions. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
We match each branch from Division 1 brand A to the geographically nearest branch 
from Division 2 brand C. The markets for the goods sold by the firm are very local - 
the firm tells us that consumers are rarely willing to travel further than 30 kilometres. 
There are four Division 1 brand A branches which do not have a Division 2 brand C 
branch within 30 km, and we exclude these from our analysis. The average distance 
between matched branches is 4.5 kilometres. 
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Table 5: Matched/Diff-in-Diff results on sales, different time periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep var: difference in 
Sales 
    
     
Nov 2001 - Jul 2002    404 
    (1727) 
     
Aug 2002 - Jul 2004 4538    
 (1433)***    
     
Aug 2002 - Jul 2003  3752 8305 8671 
  (1670)** (1815)*** (2520)*** 
     
Aug 2003 - Jul 2004  4992 8903 9216 
  (1557)*** (1694)*** (2299)*** 
     
Aug 2004 - Jul 2005   6916 7124 
   (1525)*** (1843)*** 
     
Demand -25 -23 -50 -52 
 (12)** (12)* (13)*** (17)*** 
Min temp in C 1686 1694 1354 1348 
 (446)*** (446)*** (451)*** (453)*** 
Rain fall in mm -90 -89 -80 -79 
 (12)*** (12)*** (12)*** (12)*** 
     
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 11,076 observations on 156 branches over the period 
August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, month and branch dummies included in all regressions.  
Dependent variable is the difference in sales in a division 1 branch and the geographically 
nearest division 2 branch. Demand is the difference in national demand for division 1 products 
and demand for division 2 products. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
3.2 Econometric Method 
Our setting allows us to adopt a quasi-experimental design method
13
 and use a 
combination of matching and a difference-in-difference estimator. As highlighted 
above, a major problem in the literature that attempts to identify the impact of 
                                                 
13
 See, inter alia, Cook and Campbell (1979) and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997). For a recent 
survey see Blundell and Costa-Dias (2005). 
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incentive schemes has been the fact that organisations choose whether and which 
incentive schemes to adopt - the adoption of the incentives scheme is endogenous.  
We are able to use the fact that the firm implemented the Balanced Scorecard in one 
part of the firm, but not the other, to tackle this problem. Differencing between the 
matched branches allows us to control for all of those factors that have a similar affect 
on the two branches. We control for the factors that affect the branches differently, 
such as the weather. 
To see this, we can write the determinants of sales for each type of branch, where we 
denote branches within Division 1 Brand A with subscript i and within Division 2 
Brand C with subscript j 
(3)  
jrtrtttrtjjrt
irttrtttrtiirt
WDLS
eBSCWDLS
ελτλλλα
γβτβββα
+++++=
++++++=
43221
43121
 
where S: sales, L: local economic factors such as labour markets, supply chain, etc., 
D: national demand, τ : seasonal (monthly) dummies, W: weather, BSC: indicators of 
the use of the balanced scorecard, ε,e : idiosyncratic shocks. 
We match each branch from brand A to the geographically nearest branch from brand 
C and consider the difference between the two braches. This takes the form 
(4)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ).4433
221211
jrtirttrtt
ttrtjijrtirt
eBSCW
DDLSS
εγλβτλβ
λβλβαα
−++−+−+
−+−+−=−
 
We have argued that 11 λβ = , i.e. local market conditions effect the two type of 
branches in the same way, so that they drop out of the difference equation, and that 
22 λβ = , i.e. that changes in aggregate demand feed through into sales and profits in 
the same way, so that we can include the difference in aggregate demand for goods 
sold in the two branches. This gives: 
(4’)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ).44
33212
jrtirttrt
tttjijrtirt
eBSCW
DDSS
εγλβ
τλββαα
−++−+
−+−+−=−
 
To investigate the idea that there was a heterogeneous impact of the introduction of 
the Balanced Scorecard we extend this specification to allow the impact of the 
Balanced Scorecard to vary with managerial experience, iExperience10 γγγ += . 
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4. Results 
4.1 The overall impact of the balanced scorecard 
We start in Table 6 by considering how we parameterise the BSC variables. The 
dependent variable is the difference in sales between the matched branches. In the 
first column we include an indicator for just the two years that the incentive scheme 
was in place (August 2002 to July 2004) - so we are comparing the level of sales in 
brand A branches with brand C branches during this period with the difference in the 
level before and after this period. This shows that sales in brand A branches increased 
by an average of £4,538 per month more than brand C branches during the two year 
period in which the Balanced Scorecard was in place. In column (2) we split this 
period in half and see that the impact was similar across the two years. In column (3) 
we also include an indicator for the year after the firm put the incentive scheme on 
hold - so we are now comparing just to the two years before the Balanced Scorecard 
was implemented. We now see a larger impact around (£8,305) which diminishes 
slightly over time. In column (4) we consider whether there was an anticipation effect 
in the initial discussion period (i.e. a Hawthorne effect in anticipation of the actual 
implementation), but find no evidence of this. For the remained of this paper we stick 
to the parameterisation in column (3). In Table 6 we also see that demand for brand C 
products grew somewhat faster than brand A products (the coefficient on demand is 
negative), that there is more demand for brand A products when it is hotter, and less 
when it is raining (this makes sense as brand is more often used outside). 
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Table 6: Matched/Diff-in-Diff results on all variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep var: 
difference 
in 
Sales Gross 
profits 
Trading 
profits 
Labour 
costs 
Infrastructure Transport 
costs 
General and 
administration 
Other IT Marketing 
and 
advertising 
Aug 2002 
-  
8305 1512 771 192 91 704 28 -12 -59 12 
Jul 2003 (1815)*** (548)*** (664) (114)* (120) (73)*** (54) (32) (8)*** (14) 
           
Aug 2003 
-  
8903 2565 995 675 183 1014 115 -48 -78 19 
Jul 2004 (1694)*** (560)*** (619) (104)*** (122) (58)*** (50)** (30) (8)*** (22) 
           
Aug 2004 
-  
6916 1835 -1018 933 667 1154 88 -72 -91 -4 
Jul 2005 (1525)*** (450)*** (517)** (93)*** (126)*** (50)*** (52)* (25)*** (8)*** (15) 
           
Demand -49 -4.08 -7.61 -2.161 1.732 -0.594 0.200 -0.577 -0.333 -0.163 
 (12)*** (3.58) (4.17)* (0.785)*** (0.809)** (0.471) (0.382) (0.218)*** (0.067)*** (0.108) 
Min temp  1354 527 624 -6.60 -88.9 -40.6 34.9 -4.593 -5.457 0.372 
in C (451)*** (123)*** (148)*** (27.95) (33.2)*** (19.9)** (11.1)*** (8.180) (2.301)** (2.821) 
Rain fall  -79 -19.0 -22.8 0.144 -0.957 0.167 -0.724 0.840 0.017 0.100 
in mm (12)*** (3.3)*** (3.9)*** (0.774) (0.807) (0.484) (0.333)** (0.255)*** (0.066) (0.095) 
           
R-
squared 
0.15 0.20 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 
           
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 11,076 observations on 156 branches over the period August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, month and branch 
dummies included in all regressions. Dependent variable is the difference in variable indicated in a division 1 brand A branch and the geographically 
nearest division 2 brand C branch. Demand is the difference in national demand for division 1 products and demand for division 2 products.* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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These results suggest that the Balanced Scorecard had an impact on increasing sales, 
but what about profits? In Table 7 we look at how gross profits, trading profits, labour 
costs, infrastructure expenditure, transport costs, general and administrative costs, 
information technology expenditure, local marketing and advertising expenditure and 
other costs were effected. 
The first column of Table 7 repeats column (3) of Table 6. All regressions include 
controls for aggregated demand, the weather, month and branch effects. In column (2) 
we see that there was also a corresponding increase in gross profits (the difference 
between sales and gross profits is the cost of goods sold). In column (3) we see that 
this did not feed through into an increase in trading profits, and in fact led to a fall in 
profits in the later period of on average -£1,018. The difference between gross and 
trading profits is the costs considered in columns (5)-(10). The fall in profits arose 
largely because transport costs (column 6) and labour costs increased (column 4), and 
to a lesser extent because infrastructure (column 5) and general and administrative 
costs (column 7) increased. Other and IT costs actually fell. 
This is the first empirical result of the paper - the Balanced Scorecard lead to an 
increase in sales, but costs increased by at least as much as sales at the aggregated 
branch level, so there was no increase (and actually some decrease) in profits. 
 
4.2 Did the balanced scorecard target the right tasks? 
One important question is whether the Balanced Scorecard targeted the right tasks - 
i.e. tasks that would improve performance. Did branches that improved on the non-
financial aspects measured subsequently experienced improved performance? Did the 
Balanced Scorecard correctly identify the key drivers of performance? We use the 
data collected under the Balanced Scorecard to distinguish between branches that 
successfully put effort into improving on the non-financial measures from those 
which did not. For each branch we calculate what proportion of the total non-financial 
points that were available they earned. This ranges from 16% to 74% and has a 
median value of 52%. 
In Table 8 we split the sample into those branches that were below and above the 
median share of points earned on the non-financial measures. In the top half of Table 
8 we consider the change in outcomes of those branches that either did not try, or 
were not able, to perform well on the non-financial measures, and in the bottom half 
those branches that did well on the non-financial measures. 
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Table 7: Matched/Diff-in-Diff results on all variables - comparison of branches on non-financial balanced scorecard 
measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep var: 
difference 
in 
Sales Gross 
profits 
Trading 
profits 
Labour 
costs 
Infrastructure Transport 
costs 
General and 
administration 
Other IT Marketing 
and 
advertising 
5,538 observations on 78 branches scoring below median on non-financial balanced scorecard measures 
           
Aug 2002 -  1947 -450 -838 -91 -64 667 18 -2 -54 17 
Jul 2003 (2706) (772) (955) (169) (177) (102)*** (77) (47) (11)*** (20) 
           
Aug 2003 -  3535 -40 -979 528 -212 970 98 -5 -79 40 
Jul 2004 (2508) (790) (871) (160)*** (173) (94)*** (68) (44) (11)*** (27) 
           
Aug 2004 -  3 -353 -2725 681 490 1121 147 -62 -83 -13 
Jul 2005 (2328) (690) (785)*** (147)*** (216)** (80)*** (89)* (37)* (13)*** (20) 
           
5,538 observations on 78 branches scoring above median on non-financial balanced scorecard measures 
           
Aug 2002 -  14676 3500 2385 475 251 740 37 -21 -65 8 
Jul 2003 (2405)*** (767)*** (911)*** (152)*** (162) (103)*** (77) (45) (13)*** (21) 
           
Aug 2003 -  14266 5188 2980 822 580 1057 130 -91 -78 -0 
Jul 2004 (2263)*** (771)*** (860)*** (133)*** (171)*** (67)*** (72)* (39)** (12)*** (36) 
           
Aug 2004 -  13583 3985 680 1182 838 1186 31 -84 -99 6 
Jul 2005 (1960)*** (570)*** (663) (113)*** (126)*** (61)*** (53) (33)** (8)*** (22) 
           
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Period August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, month and branch dummies, demand, min temperature and 
monthly rainfall included in all regressions. Dependent variable is the difference in variable indicated in a division 1 brand A branch and the 
geographically nearest division 2 brand C branch. Demand is the difference in national demand for division 1 products and demand for division 2 
products. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Matched/Diff-in-Diff results on all variables - branches scoring below median on financial measures in pre-
Aug2002 period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep var: 
difference 
in 
Sales Gross 
profits 
Trading 
profits 
Labour 
costs 
Infrastructure Transport 
costs 
General and 
administration 
Other IT Marketing 
and 
advertising 
3408 observations on 48 branches below median on non-financial balanced scorecard measures 
           
Aug 2002 -  1665 -564 -418 -385 -304 552 20 -25 -49 14 
Jul 2003 (3533) (965) (1227) (213)* (211) (127)*** (87) (57) (14)*** (27) 
           
Aug 2003 -  678 -231 -147 -18 -550 828 53 -35 -77 47 
Jul 2004 (3301) (956) (1027) (207) (206)*** (124)*** (80) (57) (14)*** (38) 
           
Aug 2004 -  -7080 -1369 -2269 -151 105 940 96 -164 -73 -8 
Jul 2005 (3131)** (929) (1023)** (195) (177) (96)*** (134) (47)*** (20)*** (26) 
           
2,130 observations on 30 branches above median on non-financial balanced scorecard measures 
           
Aug 2002 -  19833 4001 2605 490 183 730 19 118 -48 4 
Jul 2003 (4035)*** (972)*** (1352)* (266)* (296) (164)*** (108) (73) (17)*** (23) 
           
Aug 2003 -  20045 5155 2626 981 296 1077 75 25 -47 -22 
Jul 2004 (3951)*** (984)*** (1225)** (249)*** (213) (110)*** (123) (64) (19)** (26) 
           
Aug 2004 -  16018 3238 -546 1065 837 1308 -61 -69 -85 -14 
Jul 2005 (3365)*** (708)*** (986) (195)*** (230)*** (90)*** (92) (53) (13)*** (14) 
           
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Period August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, month and branch dummies, demand, min temperature and 
monthly rainfall included in all regressions. Dependent variable is the difference in variable indicated in a division 1 brand A branch and the 
geographically nearest division 2 brand C branch. Demand is the difference in national demand for division 1 products and demand for division 2 
products. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Here we see large differences between the two groups. In the top panel branches that 
did poorly on non-financial measures did not experience any significant growth in 
sales, but they did experience some increases in costs, leading to reduced trading 
profits. In contrast, those branches that did well on the non-financial measures saw an 
increase in sales, gross profits and trading profits. While costs did increase in these 
branches, sales increased by more, resulting in higher profits.  
Figure 3 shows a similar picture. Each dot represents a brand a branch. The x-axis 
shows the share of possible non-financial points earned, and the y-axis shows branch 
profits (scaled by sales). The correlation between these is 0.66 and is statistically 
significant. 
Figure 3:  Comparison of non-financial with financial performance during 
Balanced Scorecard 
 
Notes: 156 observations (one for each Division 1 Brand A branch); x-axis is the share that each branch 
earned of the total points they could have earned on the non-financial BSC measures (customer, 
internal, people and supplier) over the period August 2002 - July 2004; y-axis is the share  that 
each branch earned of the total points they could have earned on the financial BSC measures 
over the period August 2002 - July 2004. 
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One concern is that this could simply be showing that good branches (or good branch 
managers) do well on both financial and non-financial indicators. Proponents of the 
Balanced Scorecard argue that giving branches an incentive to put effort into a 
broader range of factors that feed into long run performance will lead to better 
performance in the long run. Opponents of the Balanced Scorecard argue that giving 
managers and workers so many different incentive will lead to worse performance as 
individuals lose focus and put too much effort into the easiest tasks. To investigate 
this we make a further comparison. We consider branch financial performance during 
three time periods - prior to the Balance Scorecard (August 1999 - July 2002), during 
the Balanced Scorecard (August 2002 - July 2004) and after (August 2004 - July 
2005).  
Figure 3b: Comparison of non-financial with financial performance during the 
Balanced Scorecard, using profits over sales rather than BSC 
measures. 
 
Notes: 156 observations (one for each Division 1 Brand A branch); x-axis is the share that each branch 
earned of the total points they could have earned on the non-financial BSC measures (customer, 
internal, people and supplier) over the period August 2002 - July 2004; y-axis is the share  that 
each branch earned of the total points they could have earned on the financial BSC measures 
over the period August 2002 - July 2004. 
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In Figures 3 and 3b we show that good performance on the non-financial points 
during the Balanced Scorecard also led to good financial performance afterwards. In 
Figure 4 we split by financial performance in the period before the Balanced 
Scorecard was introduced. The relationship is stronger in those branches which 
previously performed badly than in those that did well (correlation coefficient (p-
value) of 0.727 (0.000) and 0.346 (0.002) respectively).  
Figure 4: Comparison of non-financial with financial performance during 
Balanced Scorecard, split by financial performance before BSC 
 
Notes: 156 observations (one for each Division 1 Brand A branch); x-axis is the share that each branch 
earned of the total points they could have earned on the non-financial BSC measures (customer, 
internal, people and supplier) over the period August 2002 - July 2004; y-axis is the average value of 
trading profits over sales for each branch over the period August 2002 - July 2004; left-hand panel are 
those branches that had below median ratio of profit to sales over the period August 1999 - July 2002. 
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In Figure 5 we show this same picture separately for branches that did poorly in 
financial terms in the period before the Balanced Scorecard and those that did well, 
and we see a positive effect in both cases. 
Figure 5:  Comparison of non-financial with financial performance after 
Balanced Scorecard 
 
Notes: 156 observations (one for each Division 1 Brand A branch); x-axis is the share that each branch 
earned of the total points they could have earned on the non-financial BSC measures (customer, 
internal, people and supplier) over the period August 2002 - July 2004; y-axis is the average 
value of trading profits over sales for each branch over the period August 2004 - July 2005. 
These pictures are suggestive, but we haven’t controlled for any of the local economic 
time varying factors we were concerned with above. To do this we return to the 
regressions of the form of equation (4) and we compare performance in four groups of 
branches - (1) those who did badly on financial measures prior to implementation of 
the Balanced Scorecard, and who subsequently also did badly on non-financial 
measures during the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard, (2) those who did 
badly on financial measures prior to implementation and well on non-financial during 
implementation, (3) those who did well on financial measures prior but badly on non-
financial during, and (4) those who did well on financial prior and well on non-
financial during. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of non-financial with financial performance after 
Balanced Scorecard, split by financial performance before BSC 
 
Notes: 156 observations (one for each Division 1 Brand A branch); x-axis is the share that each branch 
earned of the total points they could have earned on the non-financial BSC measures (customer, 
internal, people and supplier) over the period August 2002 - July 2004; y-axis is the average 
value of trading profits over sales for each branch over the period August 2004 - July 2005; left-
hand panel are those branches that had below median ratio of profit to sales over the period 
August 1999 - July 2002. 
 
The top panel of Table 9 shows the estimates for group (1), the bottom panel for 
group (2), the top panel of Table 8b shows the estimates for group (3) and the bottom 
panel for group (4).  
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Table 8b: Matched/Diff-in-Diff results on all variables - branches scoring above median on financial measures in pre-
Aug2002 period  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep var: 
difference 
in 
Sales Gross 
profits 
Trading 
profits 
Labour 
costs 
Infrastructure Transport 
costs 
General and 
administration 
Other IT Marketing 
and 
advertising 
2,130 observations on 30 branches below median on non-financial balanced scorecard measures 
           
Aug 2002 -  2275 -216 -1428 388 287 853 17 34 -61 23 
Jul 2003 (4124) (1197) (1446) (270) (311) (168)*** (145) (80) (19)*** (29) 
           
Aug 2003 -  7908 283 -2291 1417 316 1196 171 47 -83 29 
Jul 2004 (3779)** (1298) (1506) (244)*** (307) (143)*** (123) (70) (19)*** (34) 
           
Aug 2004 -  10617 1148 -3601 2016 1128 1406 231 111 -99 -18 
Jul 2005 (3337)*** (982) (1198)*** (211)*** (482)** (140)*** (90)** (62)* (13)*** (28) 
           
3,408 observations on 48 branches above median on non-financial balanced scorecard measures 
           
Aug 2002 -  11454 3195 2265 466 291 746 48 -107 -75 11 
Jul 2003 (2929)*** (1079)*** (1212)* (181)** (189) (133)*** (105) (57)* (17)*** (31) 
           
Aug 2003 -  10631 5227 3227 722 756 1044 166 -165 -97 14 
Jul 2004 (2678)*** (1078)*** (1158)*** (149)*** (245)*** (85)*** (89)* (50)*** (16)*** (56) 
           
Aug 2004 -  11981 4442 1444 1254 834 1110 89 -94 -109 18 
Jul 2005 (2371)*** (810)*** (880) (137)*** (147)*** (82)*** (64) (42)** (11)*** (35) 
           
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 3,672 observations on 51 branches over the period August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, month and branch 
dummies included in all regressions. Dependent variable is the difference in variable indicated in a division 1 brand A branch and the geographically 
nearest division 2 brand C branch. Demand is the difference in national demand for division 1 products and demand for division 2 products. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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What we see is a pattern that suggests that branches that do well on the non-financial 
measures also do well on financial measures. In particular, those branches that 
previously did badly on financial measures (bottom panel of Table 9a) had 
substantially higher sales during implementation period and less so after. While costs 
increased, sales increased by more, so that trading profits also increased.  
Consider the branches that did well financially prior to implementation. Those that 
did badly on non-financial measures (top panel of Table 9b) did badly in financial 
terms after implementation, while those that did well on non-financial measures 
(bottom panel of Table 9b) did well in financial terms after implementation. 
The second empirical result of the paper is to show that those branches that were 
successful on the non-financial measures also did well financially. The results also 
suggest that there was heterogeneity in the effect of the Balanced Scorecard across 
branches. We now turn to investigate what might explain this heterogeneity. 
Table 9: Years of service 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Difference in 
sales with 
nearest plumb 
Difference in 
gross profit 
with nearest 
plumb 
Difference 
in trading 
profit with 
nearest 
plumb 
Difference in 
labour cost 
with nearest 
plumb 
Difference in 
infrastructure 
with nearest 
plumb 
Difference 
in transport 
costs with 
nearest 
plumb 
[interaction is evaluated at the mean level of service = 6.6 
years] 
   
service x 
Aug02Jul03 
1724 735 401 183 80 52 
 (363)*** (107)*** (119)*** (21)*** (31)** (14)*** 
service x 
Aug03Jul04 
3181 1250 659 230 168 76 
 (353)*** (117)*** (122)*** (25)*** (26)*** (12)*** 
service x 
Aug04Jul05 
3857 1023 459 248 122 58 
 (420)*** (121)*** (130)*** (29)*** (31)*** (14)*** 
       
Aug 2002 - 
Jul 2003 
8320.609 1514.562 771.632 192.991 91.801 703.843 
 (1816.261)*** (548.967)*** (664.487) (113.290)* (119.922) (72.523)*** 
Aug 2003 - 
Jul 2004 
8939.784 2573.438 998.047 677.274 184.193 1014.065 
 (1682.480)*** (552.524)*** (616.013) (103.234)*** (121.489) (57.878)*** 
Aug 2004 - 
Jul 2005 
6938.202 1838.946 -1016.917 934.714 666.945 1154.239 
 (1512.552)*** (448.213)*** (516.483)** (91.864)*** (125.289)*** (50.343)*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 11,076 observations on 156 branches over the period 
August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, month and branch dummies, demand, min temperature and 
monthly rainfall included in all regressions. Dependent variable is the difference in variable indicated 
in a division 1 brand A branch and the geographically nearest division 2 brand C branch. Demand is the 
difference in national demand for division 1 products and demand for division 2 products. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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4.3 The importance of experience 
From a theoretical perspective why should the impact of the balanced scorecard vary 
by the experience of managers?  Some studies have argued that less experienced 
managers rely on formal measurement systems to supplement their inexperience, 
more than experienced managers (Bourne et al, 2005). We find the opposite, that the 
more experienced the manager the greater the impact of the balanced scorecard. As an 
incentive scheme there is no obvious reason why more experienced managers should 
be more motivated by the incentive scheme than less experienced managers (if 
anything, we might think the opposite as the incentive will account for a lower share 
of their total income). The consumer psychology literature makes an important 
distinction is made between motivation, ability and opportunity (Batra and Ray, 1986; 
Andrews, 1988; MacInnis et al. 1991), which is also discussed in the organisation 
design and psychology literatures (Parker and Wall, 1998). This literature makes 
explicit the distinction between: Opportunity (the freedom and scope to act), 
Motivation (the incentives to respond), and Ability (whether an individual has the 
necessary skills and capabilities to respond). The point made in both the consumer 
psychology and organisation design literatures is that the absence of any of the above 
factors significantly limits the likelihood either of action or the impact of action. In 
the case of the balanced scorecard it is clear that there is an incentive for managers to 
act – hence the motivation is in place – but do they have the opportunity and the 
ability to act?  And are the answers to these questions affected by their experience? 
To investigate this we undertook 20 systematic telephone interviews with branch 
managers. The branch managers selected for interview had all been with the firm for 
at least four years, hence they had been in post for the entire period during which the 
Balanced Scorecard operated. Each interview lasted between 45-75 minutes, during 
which time branch managers were asked a series of questions about their experiences 
with the Balanced Scorecard. Initially the interviewees were asked to explain when 
they first heard about the Balanced Scorecard and what their initial reactions were to 
the scheme. Next they were asked to explain how they introduced the Balanced 
Scorecard to their staff and to comment on the staff’s reaction to the scheme. Third 
the interviewees were asked to explain how they used the Balanced Scorecard and 
how they involved their staff in discussing the results. Fourth they were asked to 
comment on what happened to the Balanced Scorecard over the time it was in 
operation. Finally they were asked to comment on how they measured and managed 
performance in their branches today (post the Balanced Scorecard). 
From the interviews we found that, while the majority of managers interviewed were 
positive about the scheme, several raised issues that lead us to question whether they 
were able to act on the data.  The first common theme to arise was the issue of data 
quality: “I think one of the problems straight away was we didn’t have the ability to 
measure a lot of the measures correctly or the figures were wrong” – Branch 
Manager A. 
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The second was whether the measures were under the manager’s control. 
“Personally, we would discuss why it had happened and we would put an 
action plan in, just a vehicle for action plan, what we could try and do to 
improve the score, but there were certain measures that you couldn’t control 
like your cash collection.  If a customer had no money, there was absolutely 
nothing you could do to encourage them to pay the bill, so that was totally out 
of your control” – Branch Manager B. 
“Quite honestly, I used to look at the control card and I used to see oranges, I 
used to see the yellows, I used to see the greens and I knew which ones I could 
influence easily.  Okay, and I could do something about those and I would do 
it.  The ones I couldn’t do, I just had to leave” – Branch Manager C. 
Taken together – these two issues – the quality of the data and the question of whether 
the measures were under the managers’ control, clearly have an impact on a 
manager’s opportunity and ability to act, as well as their motivation to act.  Poor 
quality data undermines the managers’ confidence in the scheme, causing them to 
question whether the scheme is encouraging appropriate behaviour.   
Interestingly, the issue of control over the measures is a factor that many managers 
raised, but then some found solutions to. For example, one experienced manager, 
explained the local work around that he and his team had developed to enable him to 
act on the customer retention data that other managers said they had no control over. 
“I mean the staff that I’ve got on the counter have been with me for years and 
they will come in and say we haven’t seen Brian. If they tell you this bloke 
hasn’t been in for a week or so, you can do something about it” – Branch 
Manager D. 
The interview data suggest that the more experienced managers found ways of 
overcoming the constraints of the balanced scorecard. They did not allow issues of 
opportunity and ability to hamper their ability to act on the balanced scorecard data, 
because their experience enabled them to identify ways of overcoming these 
constraints. 
We wanted to explore the idea that more experienced managers were better able to 
utilise the information in the Balanced Scorecard. The number of interviews was not 
sufficient to allow us to analyse the response systematically. Instead, we used 
information from the firm’s payroll system. We use information on the years of 
experience of staff in each branch to look at whether more experienced workers, and 
in particular more experienced managers, responded better to the Balanced Scorecard.  
Table 10 repeats the results in Table 7 but allowing the impact of the Balanced 
Scorecard to vary with the average years of experience of all staff. Before considering 
these results, we note that a simple correlation in the data is consistent with the idea 
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that more experienced managers achieve better performance. The correlation between 
years of managerial experience and profits is 0.36 (significant at the 1% level). 
Turning to the results, in the first three columns of Table 10 we see that experience 
matters. A branch with staff with the average years of experience (6.6 years) will have 
a £400 higher level of trading profits after the Balanced Scorecard was introduced 
than a branch with all new staff. In the second three columns we show that it is the 
years of experience of senior staff that matters most. A branch with senior staff with 
the average years of experience (11.3 years) will have around £200 higher level of 
trading profits after the Balanced Scorecard was introduced than a branch with all new 
senior staff. 
In results not shown (available from authors on request) we include the average age of 
all staff and of senior staff interacted with the Balanced Scorecard indicators and 
show that it is experience, not age, that is important. Also in results not shown 
(available from authors on request) we show that if we simply split the sample on 
whether the manager has more or less than 10 years experience (approximately the 
median) we see all of the effect of the Balanced Scorecard in the greater than 10 years 
experience group.
14
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Our results suggest that the balanced scorecard had some impact, and that this impact 
varied significantly by branch. Sales increased on average across all branches, but 
costs increased by at least as much, so that while gross profits did increase, trading 
profits did not increase. There is significant variation in the impact. When we separate 
those branches that perform well on non-financial measures from those that perform 
poorly on non-financial performance measures we find that the first group – those that 
perform well on non-financial measures – experience statistically significant increases 
in sales, gross profits and trading profits. One potential explanation of this finding is 
that branches that perform well on non-financial measures and financial measures are 
simply well managed. Note that we are allowing for each branch to have a different 
average level of performance (we include branch fixed effects). To consider this 
further we split the sample into branches that perform relatively well and those that 
perform relatively poorly on financial measures in the pre-implementation period. We 
then explore whether there are differences in non-financial and financial performance 
in the implementation period. We find that, regardless of prior performance, branches 
that perform well on non-financial measures also perform well on financial measures.  
                                                 
14
 The coefficients (standard errors) on the Balanced Scorecard variables are for the branches with 
managers with less than 10 years experience: (Aug 2002-Jul2003) 206 (968); (Aug 2003 - Jul 2004) 
70 (847); Aug 2004 - Jul 2005) -1850 (796); for the branches with managers with more than 10 years 
experience: (Aug 2002-Jul2003) 1854 (896); (Aug 2003 - Jul 2004) 2218 (846); Aug 2004 - Jul 2005) 
-1339 (709). 
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Table 10: Years of service of senior staff 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Difference in 
sales with 
nearest plumb 
Difference in 
gross profit 
with nearest 
plumb 
Difference 
in trading 
profit with 
nearest 
plumb 
Difference in 
labour cost 
with nearest 
plumb 
Difference in 
infrastructure 
with nearest 
plumb 
Difference 
in transport 
costs with 
nearest 
plumb 
       
[interaction is evaluated at the mean level of service = 6.6 
years] 
   
       
service x 
Aug02Jul03 
798 377 110 94 105 33 
 (433)* (124)*** (143) (24)*** (36)*** (16)** 
service x 
Aug03Jul04 
2458 724 192 127 184 49 
 (411)*** (129)*** (140) (28)*** (32)*** (14)*** 
service x 
Aug04Jul05 
3026 535 48 111 148 32 
 (473)*** (140)*** (157) (30)*** (41)*** (16)** 
       
[interaction is evaluated at the mean level of service = 11.3 
years] 
   
       
senior 
service x 
Aug02Jul03 
589.236 228.051 185.144 56.479 -16.040 11.958 
 (146.320)*** (44.486)*** (50.396)*** (8.919)*** (8.016)** (6.797)* 
senior 
service x 
Aug03Jul04 
460.188 334.536 297.151 65.685 -10.119 17.220 
 (148.061)*** (52.536)*** (57.476)*** (8.965)*** (8.848) (5.151)*** 
senior 
service x 
Aug04Jul05 
528.470 310.504 261.701 87.282 -16.621 16.782 
 (168.709)*** (52.602)*** (57.636)*** (10.062)*** (10.726) (5.127)*** 
       
Aug 2002 - 
Jul 2003 
8317.042 1513.671 770.852 193.107 91.837 703.808 
 (1818.743)*** (549.294)*** (664.568) (113.358)* (119.905) (72.506)*** 
Aug 2003 - 
Jul 2004 
8932.893 2569.558 994.651 676.582 184.339 1013.869 
 (1684.153)*** (549.788)*** (613.455) (103.234)*** (121.502) (57.857)*** 
Aug 2004 - 
Jul 2005 
6932.842 1837.945 -1017.793 935.032 666.987 1154.207 
 (1512.138)*** (447.028)*** (515.718)** (91.249)*** (125.417)*** (50.314)*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 11,076 observations on 156 branches over the period 
August 1999 to July 2005. Constant, month and branch dummies, demand, min temperature and 
monthly rainfall included in all regressions. Dependent variable is the difference in variable 
indicated in a division 1 brand A branch and the geographically nearest division 2 brand C 
branch. Demand is the difference in national demand for division 1 products and demand for 
division 2 products. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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This finding is particularly important as it suggests that the balanced scorecard, when 
implemented correctly and adopted by the branches, has a positive impact on branch 
performance in terms of sales, gross profit and net profit.  
We then show that years of experience is an important factor in explaining these 
differences in performance. More experience managers were able to improve 
performance. We interpret this as suggesting that the information content of the 
Balanced Scorecard is what is important, not the incentive per se. 
Crucially the research reported in this paper suggests that multi-dimensional 
performance measurement systems can have a positive impact on a firm’s financial 
performance providing the measures and the associated data are presented in a way 
that enables managers and staff to act on them. It is not enough to introduce an 
incentive scheme that relates to the measures, unless that incentive scheme is 
accompanied by data that are meaningful to those who have to manage and improve 
performance. Too often, when performance measurement systems and associated 
incentive schemes are introduced they are not designed to enable staff at the front line 
to take action. The schemes are too complex and contain data which are not 
sufficiently disaggregated to enable action to be taken. How to designing 
measurement and incentive schemes configured for action is a significant challenge 
for future research. 
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Data Appendix 
Table A.1 
Job Mean number 
per branch 
Std. Dev. Min Max Mean 
experience 
Mean age 
Manager 0.883 0.359 0 2 12.971 
(9.876) 
42.088 
(8.570) 
Office 1.090 0.808 0 3 8.821 
(9.062) 
41.240 
(11.825) 
Sales_job 2.548 1.667 0 9 7.088 
(8.673) 
38.532 
(12.804) 
Driver 1.651 1.209 0 6 6.520 
(7.747) 
46.443 
(10.576) 
Warehouse 
and stockyard 
3.670 2.107 0 14 5.771 
(7.666) 
38.970 
(13.330) 
Other_job 0.354 0.543 0 2 7.579 
(7.476) 
47.572 
(13.564) 
Total 10.2 4.631 3 30 7.234 
(8.520) 
40.883 
(12.637) 
 
 
Table A.2 
Job Specific job titles included 
Branch Manager Branch Manager, Branch Manager (Designate), Heavyside Manager, Senior 
Branch Manager   
Office Administration Assistant, Administration Supervisor, Administrator, 
Assistant Branch Manager, Assistant Depot Manager, Branch Supervisor , 
Deputy Manager, Estimator, General Clerk, Typist, Office Manager, Pt 
General Clerk, Secretary, Temp General Clerk    
Sales Contracts/Sales Administrator, Credit Controller, Goods Inwards Assistant, 
Inside Sales, Pt Sales Clerk, Pt Sales Counter Supervisor, Pt Showroom 
Sales Asst, Sales Clerk, Sales Counter Assistant, Sales Counter Supervisor, 
Sales Negotiator, Sales Representative, Sales Supervisor, Showroom Sales 
Assistant, Showroom Sales Supervisor, Showroom Supervisor, Stock 
Controller   
Driver Driver, Driver LGV, Glass Cutter/Driver, Warehouse Assistant/Driver   
Warehouse/Yard Depot Manager, Depot Manager Designate, Drainage Supervisor, Foreman, 
Heavy Supervisor, Hire Assistant, Ironmongery Supervisor, Lightside 
Supervisor, Logistics Manager, Maintenance Supervisor, Office Supervisor, 
Operations Manager, Plumbing Supervisor, Product Supervisor, Pt 
Stores/Warehouse Assistant, Saturday Assistant, Shop/Yard Assistant, 
Stores/Warehouse Assistant, Temp Yard Assistant, Timber Supervisor, 
Transport Supervisor, Warehouse Supervisor, Yard Assistant, Yard 
Assistant/Driver, Yard Manager, Yard Supervisor, Yard/Warehouse 
Assistant, Yard/Warehouse Supervisor   
Other Fixer, Machine Operator, Mill Operative, Pt Cleaner, Timber Machinist, 
Trainee B2   
 
